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Abstract 
How should a Christian political scientist think about power, liberalism, and political science? In 
answering this question, this article first defines power. Considered primarily in relation to the state, 
power is exercised in conflicts of interests: by officials, parties, or groups or elites getting others to do 
something the others would not otherwise do, or keeping one or more alternative from even being 
discussed, and perhaps obscuring what the real interests of others are. Then the argument turns to 
establishing that how one thinks about power is closely related to one’s larger political theory, e.g., what 
counts as the “real interests” of a group, what is freedom, what are the necessary conditions for human 
beings to flourish, what is liberalism, what is modernity, etc. Finally, what then would a Christian approach 
to political science look like? It would be an exercise of practical reason which would take into account 
the teaching of scripture and develop an understanding of shalom (human flourishing) in relation to the 
scope, capability, and abuse of political power and also investigate the role of the Church in the political 
order. 
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Power, Liberalism, and Political Science: 
Some Christian Reflections 
 
by Daniel Edward Young, Ph.D. 
 
 
“Politics is a struggle for power over men...”—Hans J. Morgenthau1 
 
How Should a Christian Political Scientist Think about Power? 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the concept of power and its implications for a 
Christian perspective on political theory and political science. Specifically, an examination of 
power will flow into reflection on political theory, which will flow into an examination of the 
nature of political science. Power is certainly a central concept of political science, and indeed in 
some accounts, the central concept; a famous definition of politics is that it is the struggle for 
power. In fact, the theme of the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association was “Power Reconsidered.” By no means can I exhaustively discuss the concept of 
power. The literature is enormous and much of it has to do with the question of defining what 
power actually is. The difficulty of defining this concept is notorious in political science; it is 
clearly a crucial concept for the discipline, but there is no agreed upon definition of what power 
actually is.  
What I hope to do in this paper is explore some of the various conceptions of power that 
have been put forth and see what kind of issues they raise for a Christian perspective on politics. 
                                                 
1 Morgenthau 1946, 195. 
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The key question driving this paper is “How should a Christian political scientist think about 
power?” What inevitably emerges is reflection on the nature of politics itself as well as reflection 
on the nature of the discipline of political science. Thus, in this paper I wish to explore how 
power, liberalism, and political science interrelate. The concept of power (and politics as well) 
can be used in a wide variety of situations: family, the office, church bodies, and so forth, but I 
will confine my discussion to the various activities surrounding the state or what Michael 
Oakeshott has called civitas: the civil condition (Oakeshott 1975, 108; cf. Katznelson 2007, 8). 
In posing the question, I have deliberately used the term how, rather than what, as the 
former has less implication for particular solutions and more for the proper way to approach the 
subject. In other words, I want to highlight the issues that I think are important in thinking about 
power, although I do go on to present some substantive conclusions. Are some definitions of 
power more problematic for a Christian perspective? How does a Christian perspective inform 
how we define power? Are there some types of power that it would be illegitimate for Christians 
to wield? If power is an inescapable part of social life, and power itself is morally suspect, what 
does that mean for the Christian citizen or office-holder? Lest however we go too far down this 
road, contending that power is suspect altogether, a moment’s reflection may cause us to 
reconsider. Unless one is an anarchist, believing that power can never be justified, one would 
agree that lawless places like Somalia could use a great deal more power to keep order.2  
An additional difficulty of this paper is that to the best of my knowledge, there has been 
little in the way of specific Christian reflection on the concept of power as such, although there 
                                                 
2 I owe this example to O’Donovan 1996, 94. 
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has been a tremendous amount written on politics in general and the uses of power in particular.3 
I will try to situate this discussion of power within the broader Christian conversation on the 
nature of politics. In fact, the discussion of power very quickly touches on several other topics of 
importance to political theory. Such topics include freedom (does freedom refer only to external 
restraints or does it include internal restraints? Does it refer to things besides restraints?), human 
nature (what are a person’s “real” interests, i.e., those that enable him or her to flourish?), and 
liberal and non-liberal conceptions of authority and legitimacy.  
Rather than engage in an exhaustive survey of various authors and their various 
discussions of power, in this paper I have chosen to use as a starting point for engagement the 
classic sixty-page book Power: A Radical View, written by Steven Lukes, Professor of Sociology 
at New York University. It was first published in 1974 and recently reissued in a second edition 
(2005) with two additional chapters that revisit, defend, and extend his argument. Other authors 
and perspectives will be brought in as the discussion warrants, but to maintain focus I have 
thought it best to concentrate on Lukes’ seminal work. In general, I agree with Lukes’ account of 
power and his conclusions will guide the discussion. Along the way, I will try to highlight issues 
of interest for the Christian political scientist.  
In sum, the reader of this paper ought to come away with, first, a general sense of the 
various debates about power, and second, a sense of their implications for a Christian approach 
                                                 
3 The literature is huge. Some standard works include Kuyper 1931, Maritain 1951, Mouw 1976, O’Donovan 1996, 
Ramsey 1968, Simon 1951 [1993], and Wolterstorff 1983. An excellent recent work focusing in particular on 
political ideologies is Koyzis 2003. 
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to political science. I am following Lukes when I contend that the issue of power is integrally 
related to a broader political theory.  
 
What is Power? 
Before I get to Lukes’ argument, it will be helpful to have some clarification of terms. 
Terms such as power, force, coercion, and influence do not have a single accepted meaning 
among political scientists. The following definitions are derived from Robert A. Dahl’s classic 
textbook Modern Political Analysis. Dahl is among the most influential political scientists in the 
development of the discipline and so we may take his definitions as mainstream. 
 Influence. A relation among human actors such that the wants, desires, preferences, or 
intentions of one or more actors affect the actions, or predispositions to act, of one or 
more actors in a direction consistent with—and not contrary to—the wants, preferences, 
or intention of the influence-wielder(s) (Dahl and Steinbrickner 2003, 17). 
Dahl also distinguishes among forms of influence (Dahl and Steinbrickner 2003, 38-43). 
 Inducement vs. Power. Inducement occurs when A gives B a positive incentive to 
comply, e.g. receive a financial benefit. Power occurs when A threatens B with 
deprivation or sanctions. 
 Force vs. Coercion. Force is physically compelling B to do A’s will. Option of non-
compliance is removed. Coercion is threatening B with the use of force; a form of power. 
 Persuasion vs. Manipulation. Persuasion: truthful communication by A convinces B to 
change action or thinking. Manipulation: intentionally false, misleading, or distorted 
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communication by A convinces B to change action or thinking. 
 Authority. B automatically, unthinkingly obeys A. Many scholars add that this obedience 
is because B perceives a moral obligation to obey A. 
With these definitions in mind, let me summarize Lukes’ argument. In the current 
discussion on power there are generally considered to be three dimensions or “faces” of power. 
Lurking beneath this somewhat theoretical debate about what power is lies the question of how 
widely power is distributed in American society; that is, who wields power? Lukes believes that 
the perspective on power one takes (one, two, or three dimensional) correlates with liberal, 
reformist, and radical political positions.  
The first face of power is what we would think of as ordinary politics: various pressure 
groups, political parties, and government officials competing openly to make policy. The 
powerful are those who win. Probably the most significant exponent of this perspective is Dahl, 
with his book Who Governs? (1961) being taken as an exemplar of this position. The key here is 
that in order to determine who is powerful, the observer looks at behavior: what actually 
happens. The conclusion that Dahl draws is that power is widely dispersed and that American 
democracy is not dominated by a small elite, as various pressure groups, parties, and government 
officials prevail at various times on various issues. In this work, Dahl roughly defines power as 
the ability of A to get B to do something B would not otherwise do. 
The second face of power focuses on the ability to set the agenda; that is, it has as much 
to do with decisions that are not made as with those that are made. Peter Bachrach and Morton 
Baratz (1962) criticize Dahl for ignoring non-decisions. Surely, they argue, it is a form of power 
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to keep certain alternatives “off the table,” to prevent them from being discussed. So, in this case, 
there is not open conflict, but rather the conflict is avoided through the use of power. In this case 
A is powerful if A can prevent an opportunity for decision from even getting on the agenda. 
Lukes contends there is a “third face” of power. He criticizes both of these camps for 
ignoring the formation of preferences (wants, interests, etc.), and for both camps being overly 
focused on observable behavior. Lukes asks whether the absence of articulated interests means 
that power is not being exerted. What if the powerful are, consciously or not, shaping the 
perceived interests of the weaker so that they do not perceive their true interests? In other words, 
if A is exercising power over B, the things that B wants are not actually in B’s interests, but in 
A’s interests; B’s real interests are obscured. For example, suppose the reigning ideology of a 
society justified natural slavery. Power is exerted on a slave in that society who believed there 
was such a thing as natural slavery and that he himself was a natural slave.  
This account of power is quite similar to Dahl’s account of the four levels of influence 
found in Modern Political Analysis (Dahl and Steinbrickner 2003, 45-48).  
1. Available Options. A’s influence over B is limited by the agenda of available options. 
Examples: A influences B to go to a movie rather than stay home and watch a video. A 
influences B to vote for Candidate 1 rather than Candidate 2. 
2. Shaping the Agenda of Options. A is able to influence B by influencing the composition 
of the agenda. Examples: A owns the movie theatre and has a say on what movies will be 
shown. A has influence in getting Candidate 1 on the ticket. 
3. Structures. “Structure” is an enduring institution, organization, or practice that shapes the 
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allocation of values like prestige, money, power, education, and so forth. Examples of 
structures are political parties, churches, families, legislatures, market, and so forth. A is 
able to influence B by influencing the structures that present the agenda. Example: A 
influences B by getting a law passed that offers a tax break to theatres to show 
documentary films. 
4. Consciousness. A influences B by influencing the way they see the world. Some options 
that actually exist may not even be considered. Example: due to the reigning ideology of 
a society, A fails to consider the option that there is no such thing as natural slavery. 
What difference does it make that Dahl uses the term influence and Lukes uses the term power? 
The word power has something of a sinister connotation. Many people, including Christians, 
seem to conceive of using power as a bad thing; are these same people against using influence?4  
From Lukes’ perspective consensual authority with no conflicts of interest is not a form 
of power. Rather, the exercise of power involves conflict of interests (2005, 35). Lukes modifies 
this perspective in his retrospective on the original book when he concedes that the exercise of 
power can be beneficial or productive. This revision gives Lukes’ analysis greater analytical 
power. Power can be used in a way that benefits people’s real interests; there are “manifold ways 
in which power over others can be productive, transformative, authoritative, and compatible with 
dignity” (Lukes 2005, 109). However, Lukes does not retract his statement about power 
involving a conflict of interest. So presumably for it to be called power in Lukes’ terms, it would 
have to go against a person’s perceived interests, not necessarily his or her actual interests. It 
                                                 
4 Thanks to my colleague Jeff VanDerWerff for calling this point to my attention. 
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seems the word domination better captures power that thwarts people’s interests, and Lukes 
states that what is called power in his original argument is better described as domination. Lukes 
does not use the term domination in his original discussion. “To speak of power as domination is 
to suggest the imposition of some significant constraint upon an agent or agents’ desires, 
purposes or interests, which it frustrates, prevents from fulfilment or even from being 
formulated” (Lukes 2005, 113). Lukes gives no name to a use of power that furthers an agent’s 
interests or fulfillment; I will use the term emancipation.  
 
Power and Political Theory 
Lukes contends that how one thinks about power is closely related to one’s larger 
political theory; thus the concept of power as domination is an essentially contested concept 
(Lukes 2005, 124). Why is this so? Domination is the use (or non-use) of power that violates a 
person’s real interests. But how do we know what a person’s “real” interests are? How do we 
know we are not just imposing our preferences on other people and stating that they simply don’t 
know any better? Thus there is a temptation to “vanguardism,” the idea that there is a particular 
elite that has greater insight into human nature and interests than the unenlightened masses, and 
thus this elite is justified in using the power of the state to enact their vision.  
This is where the truly contested nature of the concept of power arises. Lukes writes: 
“These difficulties become less serious if one simply takes what counts as ‘real interests’ to be a 
function of one’s explanatory framework and methods, which in turn have to be justified. There 
is no reason to believe that there exists a canonical set of such interests that will constitute ‘the 
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last word on the matter’—that will resolve moral conflicts and set the seal on proffered 
explanations, confirming them as true” (Lukes 2005, 148). So, in order to determine whether a 
particular exercise of power is positive or negative, one must refer to a particular political 
philosophy. Presumably a political philosophy will have an anthropology, an account of what 
human beings are like. Domination adds “to the notion of power over others the further claim 
that those subject to it are rendered less free, in Spinoza’s phrase, to live as their nature and 
judgment dictate” (Lukes 2005, 114; italics in original). This raises the question of what 
constitutes being less free and living as one’s nature and judgment dictate. In other words, what 
is freedom? 
To know what kind of power violates my freedom, we need an account of freedom. 
Lukes distinguishes between the “minimalist,” “objectivist,” and “identity” perspectives on what 
constitutes freedom, and invasions thereof. Lukes contends, and I agree, that the objectivist 
perspective is most satisfactory. In the minimalist perspective, I am free to the extent that I can 
do what I prefer to do; how these preferences are formed does not really matter. This is held to 
be so for a variety of reasons, generally because no other person can have a better vantage point 
than I do on what is in my interests. In some highly skeptical accounts, my interests are simply 
preferences. Another person may think these preferences are noble or base, wise or foolish, but 
has no objective standard by which to judge this. In other less skeptical accounts, the other 
person could objectively morally judge my preferences to be good or bad, but the moral 
importance of my freely choosing the good would override any interference by the other. This 
minimalist account downplays the idea of a human nature, according to Lukes. “My ‘nature’ is 
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simply an array of given preferences as revealed by my choices, and my ‘judgment’ is whatever I 
choose” (Lukes 2005, 114). In other words, I don’t really have a nature against which to judge 
my particular preferences. 
However, most people would want to say that there are instances when my preferences 
are objectively bad and that I am in error in having them: I am not being autonomous (thinking 
for one’s self) and authentic (being true to one’s nature) in preferring these things. This raises the 
question, as Lukes notes, of what constitutes rationality. Some reasons for concluding that I am 
in error are that I have reasoned poorly, am deceived, miscalculate, or am manipulated. Or 
perhaps I have an incorrect idea of what my nature is. Power can be used to bring these errors 
about: for example, in a slave-holding society, propaganda can inculcate the idea that some 
humans are naturally slaves. To the extent that slaves actually believe this, they cannot choose 
rightly. Furthermore, if I am not acting autonomously, it is in my real interest to have power 
exerted against me to prevent me from doing what is only apparently in my interest, but really is 
not. Conversely, it is in my real interest to have power exerted to compel me to do something 
which is truly in my interest, but apparently is not. In these cases, power is used to benefit me, to 
further my flourishing; such a use of power is emancipatory. 
If this is true, we move to an “objectivist” position, in which the question is asked: “what 
are the necessary conditions for human beings to flourish?” (Lukes 2005, 117). A variety of 
answers have been given to this question but most involve things like food, shelter, clothing, 
emotional attachment, self-direction, and the like. There can of course be some cross-cultural 
variation on this, but the basic idea is that every human being, no matter in what place or what 
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time, must have things like these in order to flourish. Hence this provides an objective vantage 
point for an outsider to make some judgments as to whether or not a particular use of power 
should be considered emancipatory or dominating. To prevent an objectivist position from 
becoming repressive, we would have to include in our account of human flourishing some sort of 
concept of self-direction such that doing something in our interest must be done willingly, else it 
is not truly conducive to our interests.  
Lukes goes on to consider a position that might be considered as an alternative to the 
objectivist position: the “identity” position, in which domination is seen as a violation of one’s 
individual or collective identity. Bringing in the issue of identity highlights the subjective aspect 
of human existence. Regarding identity, domination can occur when a person’s connection to a 
particular identity is repressed, or when a particular collective identity represses a person, 
compelling him or her to identify with that identity regardless of that individual’s wishes. But 
how do we know when the assertion of identity is repressive? Lukes concludes that the identity 
position is not really distinct from the objectivist position, for presumably an account of human 
flourishing would include an account of how identity plays a role in human flourishing. That is, 
when is identity expressed or imposed in ways conducive to human flourishing and when it is 
expressed or imposed in ways that are not conducive to human flourishing? So, we are thrown 
back on to the objectivist position. “In short, it is hard to see how the notion of identity-related or 
recognitional domination can do without presupposing a notion of real or objective interests, 
grounded in a theory of human nature” (Lukes 2005, 121).  
Northwestern Review, Vol. 2, Issue 1 
 “Power, Liberalism, and Political Science” by Dr. Daniel Young 
 12 
 
 
 
Copyright Daniel Edward Young. Readers of this item may copy it without the copyright owner’s permission as long 
as the author and publisher (NWCommons) are acknowledged in the copy and the copy is used for educational, not-
for-profit purposes. 
 
 
I endorse Lukes’ conclusion; if he is correct, then it seems that a Christian political 
scientist ought to have at the very least a sketch of what constitutes human flourishing, or to use 
a biblical term, shalom. There is a long history of this in Christian political thought. Probably the 
most significant tradition is that of Thomism, which draws on Aristotelian roots. Aristotle saw 
men (the masculine term is deliberate) as political animals; a man who did not live in a polis was 
either a beast or a god. In Aristotle’s view, the polis was necessary for human flourishing. 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics was about human flourishing, and its immediate successor 
Politics was about the institutional and social requirements for that human flourishing.  
A gap in Lukes’ analysis is that it does not adequately discuss political power. Ira 
Katznelson (discussed in more detail below) notes that many post-1950s analyses of power are 
disconnected from the problem of the state; Lukes’ work falls into that category, although his 
discussion of the inevitability of philosophical framework necessarily raises the questions of 
political philosophy. Assuming that Lukes’ analysis is correct, we are still faced with the 
questions of, first, the legitimate scope of the wielding of political power, second, the capability 
of political institutions to exercise power in an efficacious manner, and third, the potential abuse 
of political power.  
Regarding the first question, noted political philosopher Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990) 
usefully distinguishes between civil association and enterprise association. The former is 
characterized by law as a set of rules that enables citizens to pursue their various purposes, 
without imposing a purpose on them. The latter is characterized by common agreement on the 
substantive purposes of the association, and the rules are written so as to further that purpose. 
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European political thought and the practice of European states can be described as a tension 
between these two conceptions of association.5  
Regarding the second question, the fact that policy makers seek to accomplish a 
particular goal does not mean that they will be successful. Furthermore, regardless of whether or 
not the institution accomplishes its goal, there may be all kinds of undesirable consequences that 
outweigh the benefits achieved. 6  
Regarding the third question, it is a commonplace that the wielders of political power do 
not always wield it in the public interest. The containment or channeling of political power has 
thus been a common theme in modern political thought. In reflecting on the use of power, one 
should keep these limitations in mind.  
 
Christian Political Theory and the Use of Power 
How has Christian political thought considered the use of power? The mainstream of 
Christian political thought, particularly the Catholic and Reformed traditions, has seen power as 
a legitimate tool of political authority. Some thinkers such as Augustine seem more suspicious of 
power, noting its temptations and its remedial nature due to human sinfulness, while others such 
as Aquinas seem less suspicious, focusing more on the ideal government and its use of power.7 
Among contemporary Christian political thinkers, both the neo-Calvinists and neo-Thomists 
                                                 
5 Oakeshott 1975. For a discussion of the two ideal forms of association, see Part II; for the historical investigation 
of these forms see Part III. 
6 A useful discussion of this is Rhoads 1985. Classic works on this topic are Hayek 1994 and Lindblom 1977. 
7 There is considerable debate among Augustine scholars as to whether Augustine believed government itself was a 
result of the fall or is natural to humans. For a useful list of sources on this topic, see Breyfogle 2005, 231. 
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follow Aquinas, while the Christian realists have a more Augustinian approach. Both the 
optimistic and pessimistic strands however read Paul’s discussion in Romans 13 as legitimizing 
government and its use of power and validating Christian participation in government. The major 
question about political power then is the question of legitimacy: who has the right to use this 
power?  
A succinct statement of the mainstream position was given by the late Christian ethicist 
Paul Ramsey. He states: “The use of power, and possibly the use of force, is of the esse of 
politics. By this I mean it belongs to politics’ very act of being politics. You never have politics 
without the use of power, possibly armed force” (Ramsey 1968, 5). If this was so, then the 
problem was to consider how power ought to be used to further the national and international 
common good. Power could be used to further good or bad political goals, but one could not 
escape the use of power. However, even though power was of the esse of politics, it was not the 
entirety of politics. For Ramsey, good politics is the attempt to balance order (power), law, and 
justice. These three aspects of politics do not always (and perhaps rarely) fit together and 
sometimes one of them must be deemphasized to achieve the other two. However, it is never 
permissible to ignore or completely downplay one of them (Ramsey 1968, 12). 
Likewise, in The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology, 
Oliver O’Donovan defines power as “an ability to get things done by any means, whether by 
force, by authority, or by persuasion” (O’Donovan 1996, 30). Furthermore, power can be a good 
and even essential thing for political life. “It is a Western conceit to imagine that all political 
problems arise from the abuse or over-concentration of power; and that is why we are so bad at 
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understanding political difficulties which have arisen from a lack of power, or from its excessive 
diffusion. There is no abuse of power that can be blamed for the ills of Somalia” (O’Donovan 
1996, 94). 
In his book Jesus and Politics: Confronting the Powers, the Anglican neo-Calvinist Alan 
Storkey seems to disagree that power is of the esse of politics. He seems to equate power with 
control over. Presumably control over means domination: the wielding of power against a 
person’s real interests. In Storkey’s account, this desire for control results from self-slavery, the 
slavery to sin. Liberated from this self-slavery, residents of the Kingdom renounce control over 
in favor of freedom. Those who are alleged to be weak are not actually so.  
What then replaces power as control over? For those who have suffered control and 
domination, there is the experience of freedom. Jesus makes a great offer: ‘My yoke is 
easy and my burden is light’ (Matt. 11:28-30). But this is no magic offer. Its costs are 
also weighed: if the weak are to become free, the powerful must become weak. They 
must discard and deconstruct their systems of control (Storkey 2005, 154).  
What are the implications for actual politics from this perspective? Since politics is about power, 
isn’t this an anarchistic perspective? Given Storkey’s support for extensive state activity it is 
clear he is not an anarchist. And he does seem to hint at the possibility of power as being 
something other than control. “Political control gives way to something deeper—the Word and 
ways of God opening up lives to the power to do good” (Storkey 2005, 154). However, Storkey 
is vague as to who is wielding this power: is it politicians who have repented of their selfish uses 
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of power? Does redeemed political power become the “experience of freedom”? Storkey is not 
clear as to whether political power is intrinsically control over.  
O’Donovan seems to see power in more neutral terms than Storkey does. Storkey and 
O’Donovan have different readings of the Gospels on the question of whether power is bad. 
O’Donovan notes that the Gospels are to some extent hesitant about Jesus’ powers, but largely 
because people might be attracted to the power and not the Kingdom. However, Jesus’ powers 
themselves seem unproblematic (O’Donovan 1996, 96). Storkey seems to see power as 
intrinsically problematic, although apparently not entirely ruling out the constructive use of 
power. My intention here is not to adjudicate between their readings (that is beyond my 
competence) but simply to note their divergent readings regarding power. 
The Anabaptist tradition has displayed considerably more suspicion of political power. It 
sees Paul as acknowledging that God uses political power to maintain order, but generally sees it 
as problematic for Christians to wield, particularly if it involves violence. The state, in the words 
of the Schleitheim Articles, is “outside the perfection of Christ.” The late John Howard Yoder is 
the most significant contemporary exponent of this position (Yoder 1994). Some thinkers in the 
Reformed or evangelical world have attempted to incorporate this tradition into their own 
thought; Storkey seems to be in this camp. Some contemporary Christian political thought of an 
ecclesiological bent, both Protestant and Catholic, has incorporated this perspective into its 
thought.8 In this perspective, the Church is generally seen as an alternative polis to that of the 
                                                 
8 See for example Hauerwas 1985 [1992], Cavanaugh 2002. 
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state. A Christian’s primary loyalty and source of identity is the Church, not the state; to do 
otherwise is idolatrous. 
The dissident Czech playwright Václav Havel wrote a seminal 1978 essay entitled “The 
Power of the Powerless” (Havel 1992) in which he put forth the idea of “living in the truth” as 
the antidote to ideology. One would simply refuse to go along with the ideology. Ideology, the 
reader will recall, is closely related to Lukes’ third face of power. This approach seems to bear 
resemblances to scholars such as Storkey, Yoder, and Hauerwas. The key idea is that Christians 
do not play by the rules of liberal democratic society which institutionalize violence and 
oppression; they do not live according to the dominant ideology but rather as the peaceable 
people of the kingdom of God. Discussing the U.S. Catholic Bishops’ pastoral letter The 
Challenge of Peace, Hauerwas writes: 
It [the alternative to war] is an alternative to which the bishops point in their sensitive 
portrayal of the peace brought by Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection. Such a peace, as 
the bishops quite rightly note, is not simply the absence of war, but it is rather a peace 
that is itself an alternative to a world at war. As such it is not some ideal, but is an actual 
way of life among a concrete group of people (Hauerwas 1985 [1992], 193). 
The Church constitutes an alternative polis, the true polis, to that of the state. In reality, 
the Church may well do an extremely bad job of this. Part of Hauerwas’ project is that he 
believes the Church has been too compromised to the violence propounded by (and inherent to) 
the state. Hauerwas also does not develop a substantive theory of the state, although in fairness 
that is not his agenda. An additional difficulty, which Hauerwas to my knowledge does not 
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address, is the problem of Christian division. If we cannot even be peaceable and in communion 
among ourselves, how can we be an adequate witness to the world?  
Hauerwas’s emphasis on the Church is an important contribution to Christian political 
thought, but I do not follow him into his pacifism. But he pushes Christian political theorists to 
develop a political theory which includes a robust view of the Church, despite all its 
shortcomings, as well as includes a developed theory of the state. 
 
Political Science and Liberalism 
At this point I wish to explore the concept of liberalism, the dominant political ideology 
of the past few centuries, and see how it relates to power and political science. Is there a link 
between how Christian political thought has viewed the use of power and how power ought to be 
studied? That is, what link, if any, is there between normative evaluations of the use of power 
and how one conceives of the empirical study of political power? 
Engaging the theme of “Power Reconsidered” in his presidential address at the American 
Political Science Association meeting, Ira Katznelson (2007) discusses the marked break, or 
“historical fracture,” in the nature of politics in the 1940s. Such things as massive intentional 
non-combatant death, the Holocaust, “predatory stateness,” the perversion of the democratic 
impulse in mass movements such as fascism and communism, and the rise of utopian ideologies 
made the human condition resemble Milton’s Chaos in Paradise Lost. Before the 1940s, cruelty 
and bloodshed was nothing new, of course. But there was something unprecedented in the 
“fanaticism, levels of violence and wanton depravity achieved in the next half-decade.” He goes 
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on to recommend a retrieval of authors writing on power in the immediate aftermath of this great 
upheaval, singling out in particular C. Wright Mills’ 1956 book The Power Elite. Katznelson 
contends that later authors’ analyses of power, while making valuable contributions, seemed to 
have lost the connection of power with the modern state, which had been at the heart of this 
historical fracture. That is, the state was intricately involved in the “barbarism and carnage” of 
the 1940s (Katznelson 2007, 4). 
Interestingly, in the opening section of his address leading up to his main contentions, 
Katznelson contended that 
The Creation story in Paradise Lost tells how God supplanted the normless, disorderly, 
uncertain “eternal anarchy” and “confusion” of Chaos with a universe that place these 
elements in decent order. Few of us are believers quite like Milton. Living in a 
disenchanted world, our hopes for Creation, as it were, must lie within a modernized 
liberal tradition, the tradition within which political science resides (Katznelson 2007, 
3). 
This assertion raises several interconnected issues. If Katznelson is correct that political 
science is a product of liberal modernism and is, as he puts it, “invested in the purposes of 
Enlightenment and liberalism” then it might seem that the way political science should 
analyze power would reflect that particular philosophical framework.9 That is, what 
constitutes domination would be dependent on liberal conceptions of freedom and 
                                                 
9 My philosopher colleague Randy Jensen reminded me that Katznelson, despite referring simply to “political 
science,” is really referring to modern political science. 
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autonomy. Furthermore, if political science is a product of a disenchanted, Enlightenment 
world, what does that mean for a Christian in political science? In this section I wish to 
contest this dominant narrative of how political science ought to be done. In short, it 
wrongly brackets out key aspects of human experience relevant to the study of politics. 
Katznelson’s comments on the connection between liberalism and the discipline of 
political science strike me as overly broad; there are of course many political scientists of a 
variety of political dispositions that would not consider themselves to be working in the 
Enlightenment tradition. Prominent examples would be the postmodernists as well as 
modernity critics who derive inspiration from pre-modern modes of political thought. 
Furthermore, the kinds of things that Katznelson associates with a liberal perspective seem 
hardly confined to it. As he says himself, “Who amongst us would prefer a world lacking 
toleration, pluralism, government by consent, institutionalized representation, political 
rights, and a commitment to reason?” (Katznelson 2007, 3). While certainly such things are 
at the heart of the liberal tradition, few critics of liberalism would dismiss such things. 
Further yet, it is inaccurate to pit all Enlightenment thought against religion. In fairness to 
Katznelson, he only mentions this connection of political science and liberal modernity in 
passing and does not develop it. However, it does raise the question of the “Christian 
political scientist.” Much scholarly work has been done in recent years on modernity in 
general, and in particular on the compatibility of liberal modernity and Christianity.10  
                                                 
10 Scholars such as my historian colleague Mike Kugler have questioned the equation of Enlightenment with 
secularism or irreligion. 
Northwestern Review, Vol. 2, Issue 1 
 “Power, Liberalism, and Political Science” by Dr. Daniel Young 
 21 
 
 
 
Copyright Daniel Edward Young. Readers of this item may copy it without the copyright owner’s permission as long 
as the author and publisher (NWCommons) are acknowledged in the copy and the copy is used for educational, not-
for-profit purposes. 
 
 
What is meant by liberalism and modernity? These two concepts are closely related. In 
general, I take liberalism to be a more politically-oriented rendition of the philosophy of 
modernity; that is, while not confining itself to analysis of particular political structures, 
liberalism seems always to keep one eye towards politics, while modernity itself may not have 
that limited perspective.  
What is liberalism? At its most basic, liberalism simply refers to limited government. 
However, the most common arguments for limited government generally rest on a particular set 
of philosophical assumptions about human nature and political life. Many accounts have been 
given of this; for our purposes I find John Kekes’ account to be a good summary of the various 
renditions of liberalism (Kekes 1997, 1-22). According to Kekes, all forms of liberalism value 
pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and justice. Among liberals, there is considerable 
controversy as to the content of these values. Crudely, we can divide liberals into two camps 
based on how they view the answers to these questions: classical liberals and egalitarian liberals. 
Classical liberals, according to Kekes, see freedom as the primary value, and conceive of 
freedom as the absence of external impediment. For example, if I desire to go to Sioux Falls, 
South Dakota to go shopping, I may do so. There are no laws impeding me from doing so; I am 
limited only by my own resources, such as whether I have money for gas. This view of freedom 
correlates with the first dimension of power we discussed above. Egalitarian liberals also assert 
the primacy of freedom, but add in the necessity of welfare rights, which enable the less 
fortunate to exercise meaningful freedom. How many meaningful choices does one have if one is 
poor? However, among all these values, Kekes contends that the irreducible core of liberalism, 
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of whatever variety, is autonomy. All the values of liberalism are intended to protect this core 
value. What is autonomy?  
The essential feature of autonomy is a specific form of control that individual agents 
exercise over their actions…Autonomy therefore requires the kind of control that 
involves an unforced choice among alternatives that the agent has reasonably evaluated 
in the light of sufficient understanding of the significance of choosing one among the 
available alternatives (Kekes 1997, 16).  
This core value of autonomy touches directly on the debate over power raised in Lukes’ 
work and particularly on the contested nature of power. To exercise power (dominate?) over 
someone is (possibly) to violate his or her autonomy; it compels him or her to do something they 
would not otherwise do, and a significant part of autonomy is the making of a free, uncoerced 
choice. Is all power over people bad? Few would argue that a parent’s power over his or her 
child is bad, but what about power over adults? Can’t it be used in people’s interests? Lukes 
thinks so and notes that the suspicion of dependence is part of the liberal canon but may not be 
warranted; possibly this is a culturally specific assumption (2005, 84).  
Many versions of liberalism are highly skeptical of claims that others can see an agent’s 
real interests better than he or she can. Other versions conceive of freedom as simply the right to 
choose, regardless of what other people may think of that particular choice. As long as a 
particular choice does not harm another person, others have no right to interfere in the name of 
what that other conceives of to be in the agent’s “real” interest. This is the “minimalist” account 
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of freedom that Lukes describes. Much of the debate in liberal political theory is about the extent 
that the state may justly coerce someone.  
The idea of modernity includes the liberal conception of the autonomous individual, but 
also involves the idea of the rise of capitalism and the increasing bureaucratization of society, 
combined with the “disenchantment” of society, the discrediting of the “supernatural” or 
religious components of life, these being seen as relics of a more primitive past. Thus involved in 
modernity is the idea of progress, of ascending from a lesser to a greater state of life.  
How then is political science involved in this project of liberalism? An exhaustive 
account is well beyond the scope of this paper, but we can sketch some of the outlines of such an 
account.11 Positivism, the mainstream approach to political science, which I do not share, has 
conceived of itself as modeling itself after the hard sciences, such as physics. Just as the hard 
sciences seek to uncover regularities in behavior which may be stated in the form of laws, which 
can be used to predict behavior in the future, so political science sought to uncover laws of 
political behavior which could be tested and give rise to predictability. In other words, political 
science is a science just as much as physics is. In some ways, this is overstating the case, for 
while some political scientists seek the same level of prediction as physics, most political 
scientists tend to speak in terms of probabilities. However, what this all has in common is the 
idea of value neutrality. Just as a physicist makes no moral judgment on the outcome of the 
interaction of two particles, likewise the political scientist makes no judgment on the outcome of 
political phenomena. The values of the political scientist may guide the choice of research topic, 
                                                 
11 The account that follows is in part indebted to Heilke 2001. 
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but they play no role in the actual conduct of research. However, American political science, as 
we can see from Katznelson’s comments above, has also seen itself as seeking to preserve 
American democracy from illiberal alternatives. As a result, or so critics charge, there is 
somewhat of a bias towards the status quo. There is also a tension between value-neutrality and 
valuing the preservation of American democracy. 
Very often this scientific approach is tied in with modernity’s concept of progress. This 
includes the idea that increased political knowledge will enable greater manipulation of social 
forces. Furthermore, it often includes the idea of moral improvement or human perfectibility. 
Thus the idea is that the political scientist is a technician studying the political arena 
dispassionately yet at the service of American liberal democracy. In the same way that 
knowledge in the physical sciences is cumulative and can be exploited to increase human control 
over the natural world, so it is also the case that knowledge in the social sciences is cumulative 
and can be exploited to increase human control over the political world. 
This vision of political science has been challenged. Many scholars have called into 
question both the desirability of Enlightenment modes of thought as well as the possibility of a 
value-neutral political science.12 These scholars have criticized the conception of human beings 
as autonomous, self-creating individuals, free of any authority outside themselves that is often 
assumed by modern political theories. Typical of these critiques is that of noted Catholic political 
philosopher Charles Taylor. He argues that supposedly neutral explanatory theories are actually 
                                                 
12 See, among others, Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), Leo Strauss (1953), Charles Taylor (1985), Eric Voegelin (1952), 
and in a different vein Sheldon S. Wolin (1969).  
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based on a political philosophy, and he rejects the mainstream view of value-neutral political 
science.  
 For Taylor, a given philosophical framework has consequences for political science. “For 
a given framework is linked to a given conception of the schedule of human needs, wants, and 
purposes, such that, if the schedule turns out to have been mistaken in some significant way, the 
framework itself cannot be maintained.” Needs, wants, and purposes affect human behavior, so 
an accurate conception of needs, wants, and purposes is necessary for an accurate science of 
human behavior. “A conception of human needs thus enters into a given political theory, and 
cannot be considered something extraneous which we later add to the framework to yield a set of 
value judgements.” To repeat, political philosophy is all about human needs, wants, and 
purposes, or in other words, it is about human flourishing (Taylor 1985, 75). Just to remind 
ourselves, Lukes sees an evaluation of power as domination or emancipation as bound up in a 
theory of human flourishing. 
 Hence questions of political value are not independent of political facts; “…a given 
framework of explanation in political science tends to support an associated value position, 
secretes its own norms for the assessment of politics and policies” (Taylor 1985, 81). “[A] 
political framework cannot fail to contain some, even implicit, conception of human needs, 
wants, and purposes.” Therefore, a supposedly neutral framework has a conception of the good, 
“by restrict[ing] the range of value positions which can defensibly adopted” (Taylor 1985, 89-
90). 
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For example, if human nature is as Hobbes said it was (atomistic), that implies the 
political arena works a certain way, and that also implies which policies will be effective. If 
human nature is as Aristotle said (communitarian), then one gets a different picture of how the 
political arena works and what are appropriate policies. Aristotle’s conception of humans as 
political animals is incompatible with Hobbes’ view of humans as atomistic individuals.  
In sum, every theory has a perspective on what is important and what is not in studying a 
phenomenon. That is, some set of variables is seen as relevant and other sets of variables are 
seen as irrelevant, or at least less relevant. To study the irrelevant would be pointless. But 
different theories have different takes on what is considered relevant, and this is so because of 
differing philosophical perspectives on what is important. These philosophical perspectives act 
as what Nicholas Wolterstorff has called control beliefs. He argues that philosophical 
perspectives derived from Christian thought can act as control beliefs (Wolterstorff 1984). If this 
is so, then there can be such a thing as a Christian political science. 
 
A Christian Approach to Political Science 
What then would a Christian political science look like? Or more accurately, how should 
a Christian approach the study of political science? To begin with, I should emphasize that there 
is no such thing as the Christian political science. Different individual Christians and different 
Christian traditions will emphasize different aspects of the faith. These divergent emphases may 
even lead to contradictory views, as in the debate between the just war and pacifist traditions. 
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The interaction between these traditions of course may also be illuminating and productive of a 
more fully Christian perspective. What follows is an attempt to sketch out my own approach. 
First of all, my criticism of standard social scientific methodology should not be taken as 
a complete dismissal. There have been great advances in survey methodology, the comparative 
method, and other such social scientific strategies. There is also plenty of room for the use of 
reductionism as a heuristic device. That is, it can be useful to investigate economic life by 
assuming a motivation of interest defined as wealth, or to investigate political life by assuming a 
motivation of interest defined as power. But, when the full-orbed nature of human beings is 
forgotten, this becomes distorted. Political theorist Ruth Grant of Duke University draws a 
helpful distinction between the humanistic and scientific approaches to the study of politics. 
Roughly speaking, the humanistic approach examines issues of meaning and significance, while 
the scientific approach examines cause and effect. These approaches are not mutually exclusive 
and in fact illuminate each other (Grant 2002). Unfortunately, the title political science used for 
naming most departments concerned with the study of politics would seem to reinforce a one-
sided connection to the scientific approach.  
To say that the positivist approach to political science is the only source of true 
knowledge and to ignore “non-verifiable” aspects of political life is quite narrowing. At worst it 
can completely rule out as purely subjective the consideration of philosophical concepts such as 
the good or natural rights, substituting for them the idea of preferences.13 The political system in 
this view is an arena which enables the various actors to pursue their preferences. If this is so, it 
                                                 
13 I owe this insight to Canavan 1995, 95. He singles out Dahl 1956 for making this move. 
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is unclear how political outcomes can be evaluated as just or unjust, furthering or hindering 
human flourishing, respecting or violating natural rights, or the like. This observation ties us 
back into our discussion of the three faces of power. Can A’s preferences be evaluated by B with 
a standard other than B’s own subjective preferences? The answer that is given to this question is 
dependent upon a particular political philosophical framework. If the answer is no, they cannot 
be evaluated, we inhabit some sort of liberal framework in which ultimate questions of the good 
are privatized (at least rhetorically, for law generally sees itself as furtherance of the common 
good, and not simply the amassed preferences of the stronger). Likewise, questions of how 
power shapes preferences are set aside. 
From my discussion of power above, the reader could extract two strains of thought: a 
radical or critical strain and a conservative strain. The critical strain would focus on puncturing 
the illusions of ideology and for some thinkers the potential emancipatory use of political power. 
The conservative strain would emphasize the limitations of politics due to the human lust for 
power, the need for order, and the limits of human knowledge. An Augustinian approach to 
politics can incorporate both of these strains. Augustine’s City of God is a deconstruction of the 
claims of the Roman Empire’s ideology. Since no political community is the City of God, all 
states fall short of justice, and hence their polity, policies, and ideologies can be critiqued. On the 
other hand, Augustine is very aware of the shortcomings of human beings, especially when they 
achieve positions of power. Since any state will fall short of justice, an emphasis on order exists. 
Ramsey perhaps captures both strains with his threefold account of good politics: order, law, and 
justice.  
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This critical/conservative dynamic is not confined to Augustine. Grant contends that the 
humanistic approach itself has this dynamic: conservative in that it has one immersing oneself 
into a tradition of theoretical reflection on politics, but critical in that this immersion prompts one 
to question one’s current theoretical constructs. But given Augustine’s place both in the canon of 
political theory and his preeminence as a Christian theologian, his thought forms a good starting 
point. 
My approach is definitely on the humanistic side, and tends to be more classical and 
Augustinian in nature, although on my more optimistic days I feel a bit more neo-Thomist or 
neo-Calvinist. Classical political science asked the question “what is the best regime?” To be 
able to answer that question, one needed an account of human flourishing, so as to investigate 
which political arrangements furthered human flourishing and which political arrangements 
hindered it. In this perspective, political theory and political science are very similar, if not the 
same thing. Augustine’s political thought pays little attention to the question of the best 
regime—they were all quite imperfect—and focuses more on the character of citizens and rulers. 
This is useful, but one would not want to eliminate reflection on political structures and how they 
further the common good. The work of scholars such as Yves Simon ([1951] 1993) and Jacques 
Maritain (1951) are helpful in this regard. 
A second point I should discuss is that I have become increasingly suspicious of the idea 
of a “biblical politics,” that is, a political theory or program that can be extracted from the Bible. 
While a Christian political science would certainly seek to be consonant with biblical teaching, 
in point of fact there is very little in the way of specific discussion of politics in the Bible, despite 
Northwestern Review, Vol. 2, Issue 1 
 “Power, Liberalism, and Political Science” by Dr. Daniel Young 
 30 
 
 
 
Copyright Daniel Edward Young. Readers of this item may copy it without the copyright owner’s permission as long 
as the author and publisher (NWCommons) are acknowledged in the copy and the copy is used for educational, not-
for-profit purposes. 
 
 
the fact that its events take place against a political background. If this is true then a Christian 
political science will have to be developed from reflection on the political order itself.14 There 
are the traditional passages of Romans 13 and 1 Peter 2 (the governing authorities as God’s 
ministers) which are juxtaposed against Revelation 13 (the beast with the blasphemous names). 
More recent studies have attempted to draw out a fuller picture, the most successful of which is 
O’Donovan’s The Desire of the Nations. In that work, O’Donovan examines not only the 
political concepts present in scripture, but how they have been developed in the history of 
political thought. This gets us into the broader realm of practical reason, rather than simply 
biblical exegesis.  
What then would a Christian approach to political science look like? My current 
inclinations are that constructing a Christian political theory would be an exercise of practical 
reason which would take into account the teaching of scripture. It would attempt to develop an 
account of human flourishing or shalom. Regarding this, I am inclined toward some sort of basic 
goods account as taking into account human diversity without collapsing into relativism.15 
Certainly Christian political science would address the traditional points of examining the scope, 
capability, and abuse of political power. It would also investigate the role of the Church in the 
political order. This is an extension of the question about the relationship of political life to 
eternal things. A difficulty any political theory must face is how it can be convincing to others 
                                                 
14 For discussions of this point, see Budziszewski 2006 and Schall 2004. 
15 I am most familiar with the accounts of Finnis 1980, Nussbaum 1992, and Nussbaum 2011. 
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who do not share its assumptions. This is particularly true of Christian political thought, which 
incorporates or at least takes account of revelation.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have tried to argue the following. Power does not only include overt 
examples such as A getting to B to do something, but includes the shaping of preferences. 
Reflection on power leads one to think about whether power is used as an instrument of 
emancipation or an instrument of domination. In other words, is power used for the advancement 
of human flourishing or for its hindrance? But to know what constitutes emancipation or 
domination, one needs to have an account of human flourishing, which gets us into the realm of 
political theory or political science. Such a political science would attempt to discern how 
political institutions and processes contribute to, or detract from, human flourishing. Thus, one’s 
evaluation of a particular use of power is bound up in one’s political theory. A Christian political 
scientist would wish to develop a political theory consonant with Christian belief about human 
flourishing. Classical political science asked the question of what constitutes the best regime, and 
so a Christian approach to this kind of political science would incorporate Christian conceptions 
of human flourishing. Political science thus conceived includes both the empirical and normative 
study of politics, and these are inextricable. Perhaps a better way of conceiving it is that political 
science must make room for both the humanistic and scientific approaches to the study of 
politics. Absent the humanistic approach, the scientific approach could degenerate into an 
uncritical affirmation of the status quo. 
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Author’s Note 
 
This paper has only been a sketch of a Christian approach to political science, at least as I 
attempt to pursue that discipline. Many aspects could be developed much further and perhaps 
need to be rethought. But this is my mind as is now stands.16 
 
  
                                                 
16 Thanks are due to my colleagues Doug Anderson, Randy Jensen, Mike Kugler, Jeff VanDerWerff, and Don 
Wacome, and my wife Teresa TerHaar for their comments on, or discussion about, this paper; their input vastly 
improved it. They also gave many suggestions that I have been unable to incorporate into this version of the paper 
but will certainly be valuable in any further versions that may come. 
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